We provide recovery guarantees for compressible signals that have been corrupted with noise and extend the framework introduced in [1] to defend neural networks against 0 -norm and 2 -norm attacks. Concretely, for a signal that is approximately sparse in some transform domain and has been perturbed with noise, we provide guarantees for accurately recovering the signal in the transform domain. We can then use the recovered signal to reconstruct the signal in its original domain while largely removing the noise. Our results are general as they can be directly applied to most unitary transforms used in practice and hold for both 0 -norm bounded noise and 2norm bounded noise. In the case of 0 -norm bounded noise, we prove recovery guarantees for Iterative Hard Thresholding (IHT) and Basis Pursuit (BP). For the case of 2 -norm bounded noise, we provide recovery guarantees for BP. These guarantees theoretically bolster the defense framework introduced in [1] for defending neural networks against adversarial inputs. Finally, we experimentally demonstrate this defense framework using both IHT and BP against the One Pixel Attack [22], Carlini-Wagner 0 and 2 attacks [4], Jacobian Saliency Based attack [19], and the DeepFool attack [18] on CIFAR-10 [13], MNIST [14], and Fashion-MNIST [28] datasets. This expands beyond the experimental demonstrations of [1].
Introduction
Signal measurements are often corrupted due to measurement errors and can even be corrupted due to adversarial noise injection. Supposing some structure on the measurement mechanism, is it possible for us to retrieve the original signal from a corrupted measurement? Indeed, it is generally possible to do so using the theory of Compressive Sensing [3] if certain constraints on the measurement mechanism and the signal hold. In order to make the question more concrete, let us consider the class of machine learning problems where the inputs are compressible (i.e., approximately sparse) in some domain. For instance, images and audio signals are known to be compressible in their frequency domain and machine learning algorithms have been shown to perform exceedingly well on classification tasks that take such signals as input [12, 23] . However, it was found in [25] that neural networks can be easily forced into making incorrect predictions with high-confidence by adding adversarial perturbations to their inputs; see also [24, 9, 19, 4] .
Further, the adversarial perturbations that led to incorrect predictions were shown to be very small (in either 0 -norm or 2 -norm) and often imperceptible to human beings. For this class of machine learning tasks, we show that it is possible to recover original inputs from adversarial inputs and defend the neural network.
In this paper, we first provide recovery guarantees for compressible signals that have been corrupted by noise bounded in either 0 -norm or 2 -norm. Then we extend the framework introduced in [1] to defend neural networks against 0 -norm and 2 -norm attacks. In the case of 0 -norm attacks on neural networks, the adversary can perturb a bounded number of elements in the input but has no restriction on how much each element is perturbed in absolute value. In the case of 2 -norm attacks, the adversary can perturb as many elements as they choose as long as the 2 -norm of the perturbation vector is bounded. Our recovery guarantees cover both cases and provide a partial theoretical explanation for the robustness of the defense framework against adversarial inputs. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We provide recovery guarantees for IHT and BP when the noise budget is bounded in 0 -norm.
2. We provide recovery guarantees for BP when the noise budget is bounded in the 2 -norm. 3 . We extend the framework introduced in [1] to defend neural networks against 0 -norm bounded and 2 -norm bounded attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the defense framework introduced in [1] , which we call Compressive Recovery Defense (CRD), in Section 3.1. We present our main theoretical results (i.e. the recovery guarantees) in Section 3.2 and compare these results to related work in Section 3.3. We establish the Restricted Isometry Property (RIP) in Section 4 provide the proofs of our main results in Sections 5 and 6. We show that CRD can be used to defend against 0 -norm and 2 -norm bounded attacks in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.
Notation
Let x be a vector in C N and let S ⊆ {1, . . . , N } with S = {1, . . . , N } \ S. The support of x, denoted by supp(x), is set of indices of the non-zero entries of x, that is, supp(x) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , N } : x i = 0}. The 0 -norm of x, denoted x 0 , is defined to be the number of non-zero entries of x, i.e. x 0 = card(supp(x)). We say that x is k-sparse if x 0 ≤ k. We denote by x S either the sub-vector in C S consisting of the entries indexed by S or the vector in C N that is formed by starting with x and setting the entries with indices outside of S to zero. For example, if x = [4, 5, −9, 1] and S = {1, 3}, then x S is either [4, −9] or [4, 0, −9, 0]. In the latter case, note x S = x − x S . It will always be clear from the context which meaning is intended. If A ∈ C m×N is a matrix, we denote by A S the column sub-matrix of A consisting of the columns indexed by S.
We use x h(k) to denote a k-sparse vector in C N consisting of the k largest (in absolute value) entries of x with all other entries zero. For example, if x = [4, 5, −9, 1] then x h(2) = [0, 5, −9, 0]. Note that x h(k) may not be uniquely defined. In contexts where a unique meaning for x h(k) is needed, we can choose x h(k) out of all possible candidates according to a predefined rule (such as the lexicographic order). We also define x t(k) = x − x h(k) .
, which is a (k, t)-sparse vector in C 2n . Again, x h(k,t) may not be uniquely defined, but when a unique meaning for x h(k,t) is needed (such as in Algorithm 1), we can choose x h(k,t) out of all possible candidates according to a predefined rule.
Main Results
In this section we outline the problem and the framework introduced in [1] , state our main theorems, and compare our results to related work.
Compressive Recovery Defense (CRD)
Consider an image classification problem in which a machine learning classifier takes an image re-constructed from its largest Fourier co-efficients as input and outputs a classification decision. Let x ∈ C n be the image vector (we can assume the image is of size √ n × √ n for instance). Then, letting F ∈ C n×n be the unitary Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) matrix, we get the Fourier coefficients of x asx = F x.
It is well known that natural images are approximately sparse in the frequency domain and therefore we can assume thatx is k-sparse, that is ||x|| 0 ≤ k. In our example of the image classification problem, this means that our machine learning classifier can accept as input the image reconstructed fromx h(k) , and still output the correct decision. That is, the machine learning classifier can accept F * x h(k) as input and still output the correct decision. Now, suppose an adversary corrupts the original image and we observe y = x + e. Noting that y can also be written as y = F * x + e, we are interested in recovering an approximation x # tox h(k) upon observing y, such that when we feed F * x # as input to the classifier, it can still output the correct classification decision.
More generally, this basic framework can be used for adversarial inputs u = v + d in any input domain, as long as there exists a matrix A such that u = Av + d, wherev is approximately sparse and ||d|| p ≤ η for some p, η ≥ 0. If we can recover an approximation v # tov with bounds on the recovery error, then we can use v # to reconstruct an approximation Av # to v with controlled error.
This general framework was proposed by [1] . Moving forward, we refer to this general framework as Compressive Recovery Defense (CRD) and utilize it to defend neural networks against 0 and 2 -norm attacks. As observed in [1] , x [0] in Algorithm 1, can be initialized randomly to defend against a reverse-engineering attack. In the case of Algorithm 2, the minimization problem can be posed as a Second Order Cone Programming (SOCP) problem and it appears non-trivial to create a reverse engineering attack that will retain the adversarial noise through the recovery and reconstruction process.
Results
Our main results are stated below. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 provide bounds on the recovery error with Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 respectively when the noise is bounded in 0 -norm. Theorem 3 covers the case when the noise is bounded in the 2 -norm. We start with providing bounds on the approximation error using IHT when the noise is bounded in 0 -norm.
where F ∈ C n×n is a unitary matrix with |F ij | 2 ≤ c n and I ∈ C n×n is the identity matrix. Let y = Fx + e, wherex, e ∈ C n , and e is t-sparse. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n be integer and define
Then for any solution x [T ] = IHT (y, A, k, t, T ) of Algorithm 1 we have the error bound
where we write
withx [T ] , e [T ] ∈ C n . Moreover, if 0 < ρ < 1, then for any 0 < < 1 and any
we have
The result above applies to unitary transformations such as the Fourier Transform, Cosine Transform, Sine Transform, Hadamard Transform, and other wavelet transforms. Since the constant in the above bound can be made arbitrarily small, the recovery error in equations (2) and (3) depends primarily on x t(k) 2 which is small for sparse signals.
Next, we consider the recovery error when using BP instead of IHT. Providing bounds BP is useful as there are cases 1 when (i) BP provides recovery guarantees against a larger 0 noise budget than IHT and (ii) BP leads to a better reconstruction than IHT.
n and I ∈ C n×n is the identity matrix. Let y = Fx + e, and let 1 ≤ k, t ≤ n be positive integers. Define
If 0 < δ k,t < 1 and 0 < θ < 1, then for a solution x # = BP(y, A, ||x t(k) || 2 ) of Algorithm 2, we have the error bound
Our final result covers the case when the noise is bounded in 2 -norm. Note that the result covers all unitary matrices and removes the restriction on the magnitude of their elements. We will utilize this result in defending against 2 -norm attacks.
Theorem 3. Let F ∈ C n×n be a unitary matrix and let y = Fx + e, wherex ∈ C n is k-sparse and e ∈ C n . If ||e|| 2 ≤ η, then for a solution x # = BP(y, F, η) of Algorithm 2, we have the error bound
Comparison to Related Work
We now summarize research efforts for the problem of defending neural networks against adversarial inputs. The authors of [1] introduced the CRD framework which inspired this work. The main theorem (Theorem 2.2) of [1] is an analog of our Theorem 1 and provides a similar bound the approximation error for recovery via IHT. First note that the statement of the Theorem 2.2 of [1] is missing the required hypothesis t = O( n k ). This hypothesis appears in Lemma 3.6 of [1] , which is used to prove Theorem 2.2, but it appears to have been accidentally dropped from the statement of Theorem 2.2. We note that, by making the constants explicit, the proof of Lemma 3.6 of [1] gives the same restricted isometry property that we do in Theorem 6. Therefore, the guarantees we obtain for IHT are essentially the same as in [1] . The main difference is that, to derive recovery guarantees for IHT from the restricted isometry property, we utilize Theorem 7 below (which is a modified version of Theorem 6.18 of [8] ) while the authors of [1] utilize Theorem 3.4 in [1] (which is taken from [2] ).
Other works that provide guarantees include [11] and [5] where the authors frame the problem as one of regularizing the Lipschitz constant of a network and provide a lower bound on the norm of the perturbation required to change the classifier decision. The authors of [21] use robust optimization to perturb the training data and provide a training procedure that updates parameters based on worst case perturbations. A similar approach to [21] is [27] in which the authors use robust optimization to provide lower bounds on the norm of adversarial perturbations on the training data. In [15] , the authors use techniques from Differential Privacy [7] in order to augment the training procedure of the classifier to improve robustness to adversarial inputs. Another approach using randomization is [16] in which the authors add i.i.d Gaussian noise to the input and provide guarantees of maintaining classifier predictions as long as the 2 -norm of the attack vector is bounded by a function that depends on the output of the classifier.
Most defenses against adversarial inputs do not come with theoretical guarantees. Instead, a large body of research has focused on finding practical ways to improve robustness to adversarial inputs by either augmenting the training data [9] , using adversarial inputs from various networks [26] , or by reducing the dimensionality of the input [29] . For instance, [17] use robust optimization to make the network robust to worst case adversarial perturbations on the training data. However, the effectiveness of their approach is determined by the amount and quality of training data available and its similarity to the distribution of the test data. An approach similar to ours but without any theoretical guarantees is [20] . In this work, the authors use Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to estimate the distribution of the training data and during inference, use a GAN to reconstruct an input that is most similar to a given test input and is not adversarial.
Restricted Isometry Property
All of our recovery guarantees are based on the following theorem which establishes a restricted isometry property for certain structured matrices. First, we give some definitions. 
for all x ∈ M .
Definition 5. We define M k to be the set of all k-sparse vectors in C N and define S k to be the collection of subsets of {1, . . . , N } of cardinality less than or equal to k. Note that S k is the collection of supports of vectors in M k . Similarly, we define M k,t to be the set of (k, t)-sparse vectors in C 2n . In other words, M k,t is the following subset of C 2n :
We define S k,t to be the following collection of subsets of {1, . . . , 2n}:
Note that S k,t is the collection of supports of vectors in M k,t .
for all x ∈ M k,t . In other words, A satisfies the M k,t -RIP property with constant ckt n .
Proof. In this proof, if B denotes an matrix in C n×n , then λ 1 (B), . . . , λ n (B) denote the eigenvalues of B ordered so that |λ 1 (B)| ≤ · · · ≤ |λ n (B)|. It suffices to fix an S = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∈ S k,t and prove (7) for all non-zero x ∈ C S . Since A * S A S is normal, there is an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors u 1 , . . . , u n for A * S A S , where u i corresponds to the eigenvalue λ i (A * S A S ). For any non-zero
Thus it will suffice to prove that |λ i (A * S A S ) − 1| ≤ ckt n for all i. Moreover,
where the last equality holds because A * S A S − I is normal. By combining (8) and (9), we see that (7) will hold upon showing that the eigenvalues of (A * S A S − I) * (A * S A S − I) are bounded by ckt/n. So far we have not used the structure of A, but now we must. Observe that (A * S A S − I) * (A * S A S − I) is a block diagonal matrix with two diagonal blocks of the form X * X and XX * . Therefore the three matrices (A * S A S − I) * (A * S A S − I), X * X, and XX * have the same non-zero eigenvalues. Moreover, X is simply the matrix F S 1 with those rows not indexed by S 2 deleted. The hypotheses on F imply that the entries of X * X satisfy |(X * X) ij | ≤ ct n . So the Gershgorin disc theorem implies that each eigenvalue λ of X * X and (hence)
Algorithm 1 (k, t)-Iterative Hard Thresholding Input: The observed vector y ∈ C n , the measurement matrix A ∈ C n×2n , and positive integers k, t, T ∈ Z + Output:
Iterative Hard Thresholding
Now we utilize the result of Theorem 6 to prove recovery guarantees for the following Iterative Hard Thresholding algorithm.
we have the approximation error bound
18 and ρ < 1; the latter implies that the first term on the right goes to zero as T goes to ∞.
Theorem 7 is a modification of Theorem 6.18 of [8] . More specifically, Theorem 6.18 of [8] considers M 3k , M 2k , and S k in place of M 3k,3t and M 2k,2t and S k,t and any dimension N in place of 2n. The proofs are very similar, so we omit the proof of Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 1. . Theorem 6 implies that the statement of Theorem 7 holds with δ 3 = c·3k·3t n and δ 2 = c·2k·2t n .
we can use the same reasoning as used in [1] . We first
Since the support of (e [T −1] − e) is at most 2t and since |F ij | 2 ≤ c n , we can use the fact that for a 2t-sparse vector v, ||v|| 1 ≤ √ 2t||v|| 2 to get the bound: (2) . We get (3) by noting thatx h(k) − z h(k) is 2k sparse and therefore:
Basis Pursuit
Next we introduce the Basis Pursuit algorithm and prove its recovery guarantees for 0 -norm and 2 -norm noise.
Algorithm 2 Basis Pursuit
Input: The observed vector y ∈ C n , where y = Ax + e, the measurement matrix A ∈ C n×N , and the norm of the error vector η such that ||e|| 2 ≤ η Output:
We begin by stating some definitions that will be required in the proofs of the main theorems. 
Note that if q = 1 then this is simply the robust null space property.
The proof of Theorem 2 requires the following theorem (whose full proof is given in the cited work).
Theorem 10 (Theorem 4.33 in [8] ). Let a 1 , . . . , a N be the columns of A ∈ C m×N , let x ∈ C N with s largest absolute entries supported on S, and let y = Ax + e with ||e|| 2 ≤ η. For δ, β, γ, θ, τ ≥ 0 with δ < 1, assume that:
and that there exists a vector u = A * h ∈ C N with h ∈ C m such that
If ρ := θ + βγ (1−δ) < 1, then a minimizer x # of z 1 subject to Az − y 2 ≤ η satisfies:
We will need another Lemma before proving Theorem 2.
Proof. Let S ∈ S k,t be given. Then for any x ∈ C S , we have
We can re-write this as :
Proof of Theorem 2. We will derive equation (4) by showing that the matrix A satisfies all the hypotheses in Theorem 10 for every vector in M k,t .
First note that by Theorem 6, A satisfies the M k,t -RIP property with constant δ k,t := ckt n . Therefore, by Lemma 11, for any S ∈ S k,t , we have A * S A S − I 2→2 ≤ δ k,t . Since A * S A S is a positive semi-definite matrix, it has only non-negative eigenvalues that lie in the range [1 − δ k,t , 1 + δ k,t ]. Since δ k,t < 1 by assumption, A * S A S is injective. Thus, we can set: h = A S (A * S A S ) −1 sgn(x S ) and get:
1−δ k,t and we have used the following facts:
and that the largest singular value of A S is less than 1 + δ k,t . Now let u = A * h, then ||u S − sgn(x S )|| 2 = 0. Now we need to bound the value ||u S || ∞ . Denoting row j of A * S A S by the vector v j , we see that it has at most max{k, t} non-zero entries and that |(v j ) l | 2 ≤ c n for l = 1, . . . , (k + t). Therefore, for any element (u S ) j , we have:
max{k, t}c n
Defining β := max{k,t}c n and θ := √ k+t 1−δ k,t β, we get ||u S || ∞ ≤ θ < 1 and also observe that max l∈S A * S a l 2 ≤ β. Therefore, all the hypotheses of Theorem 10 have been satisfied. Note that
we use the fact ||Fx t(k) || 2 = ||x t(k) || 2 combined with the bound in Theorem 10 to get (4):
We note that since Algorithm 2 is not adapted to the structure of the matrix A in the statement of Theorem 2, one can expect the guarantees to be weaker. We now focus on proving Theorem 3. In order to do so, we will need to state a some lemmas that will be used in the main proof. 
Proof. For any
Lemma 13 (Theorem 4.20 in [8] ). If a matrix A ∈ C m×N satisfies the 1 robust null space property (with respect to ||.||) and for 0 < ρ < 1 and τ > 0 for S ⊂ [N |, then: and v ∈ C n , we have
where τ = 1. Therefore, F satisfies the 2 robust null space property for all S ⊆ [n] with card(S) ≤ k. Next, using Lemma 12 we get ||v S || 1 ≤ ρ||vS|| 1 + τ √ k||F v|| 2 for all v ∈ C n . Now let x # = BP(y, F, η), then we know ||x # || 1 ≤ ||x|| 1 , where x is k-sparse. Then letting S ⊆ [n] be the support of x and using the fact that ||x S || 2 = 0 and Lemma 13 , we get: Type  Properties  1  Convolution  32 channels, 3 × 3 Kernel, No padding  2 Convolution 64 channels, 3 × 3 Kernel, No padding, Dropout with p = 0.5 3
Max-pooling 2 × 2, Dropout with p = 0.5 4
Fully Connected 128 neurons, Dropout with p = 0.5 5 Fully Connected 10 neurons Letting ρ → 0 and recalling that τ = 1 gives (5) . Now let S be the support of the k largest entries in
Then, using Lemma 14 and (10), we see that
Recalling τ = 1 and letting ρ → 0 gives the desired result.
Experiments
We first analyze how our recovery guarantees perform in practice (Section 7.1) and then show that CRD can be used to defend neural networks against 0 -norm attacks (Section 7.2) as well as 2 -norm attacks (Section 7.3). All of our experiments are conducted on CIFAR-10 [13] , MNIST [14] , and Fashion-MNIST [28] datasets with pixel values of each image normalized to lie in [0, 1]. For every experiment, we use the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and the Inverse Discrete Cosine Transform (IDCT) denoted by the matrices F ∈ R n×n and F T ∈ R n×n respectively. That is, for an adversarial image y ∈ R √ n× √ n , such that, y = x + e, we letx = F x, and x = F Tx , where x,x ∈ R n and e ∈ R n is the noise vector (bounded either in 0 or 2 -norm). For an adversarial image y ∈ R √ n× √ n×c , that contains c channels, we perform recovery on each channel independently by considering y m = x m + e m , wherê x m = F x m , x m = F Tx m for m = 1, . . . , c. The value k denotes the number of largest (in absolute value) DCT co-efficients used for reconstruction of each channel, and the value t denotes the 0 noise budget for each channel.
We now outline the neural network architectures used for experiments in Section 7.2 and 7.3. For CIFAR-10, we use the network architecture of [10] Fashion-MNIST datasets is provided in Table 1 . We train our networks using the Adam optimizer for CIFAR-10 and the AdaDelta optimizer for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. In both cases, we use a cross-entropy loss function. We implement the following training procedure: for every training image x, we first generatex h(k) = (F x) h(k) , and then reconstruct the image x = F Tx h(k) . We then use both x and x to train the network. For instance, in MNIST we get 60000 original training images and 60000 reconstructed training images, for a total of 120000 training images. The code to reproduce our experiments is available here: https://github.com/jasjeetIM/recovering_ compressible_signals. 
Recovery Error
Since recovery guarantees for Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 have been proved theoretically, our aim is to examine how close the recovery error is to the upper bound in practice. Each experiment is conducted on a subset of 500 data points sampled uniformly at random from the respective dataset. We first provide the experimental results for the case of 0 -norm bounded noise in Section 7.1.1 and then for the case of 2 -norm bounded noise in Section 7.1.2.
0 noise
For each data point x i ∈ R n , i = 1, 2, . . . , 500, we construct a noise vector e i ∈ R n as follows: we first sample an integer t i from a uniform distribution over the set {1, . . . , t}, where t is the allowed 0 noise budget. Next, we select an index set S t i ⊂ [n] uniformly at random, such that card(S t i ) = t i .
Orig. Acc. OPA. Acc Corr. Acc. 77.4% 0.0% 68.3% Table 5 : Effectiveness of CRD against OPA. The first column lists the accuracy of the network on original images and the OPA Acc. columns shows the network's accuracy on adversarial images. The Corr. Acc. column shows the accuracy of the network on images reconstructed using Algorithm 1. Then for each j ∈ S t i , we set (e i ) j = c j , where c j is sampled from the uniform distribution on [0, 1) and (e i ) l = 0 for l / ∈ S t i We then set y i = x i + e i as the observed noisy vector. The first metric we report is
is the recovered vector for the noisy measurement y i , (x i ) h(k) = (F x i ) h(k) and the average is taken over the 500 points sampled from the dataset. This measures the average magnitude of the recovery error for the respective algorithm in p norm. In order to relate this value to the upper bound on the recovery error, we also report ∆ p := 1
where Υ i is the guaranteed upper bound (as per our Theorems 1 and 2) for y i . Using δ p and ∆ p , we aim to capture how much smaller the recovery error is than the upper bound for these datasets. Finally, we also report t avg := 1 500 500 i=1 t i .
Recovery with Algorithm 1
We set k = 4 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST and are allowed an 0 noise budget of t = 3. For CIFAR-10, we set k = 5 and are allowed a noise budget of t = 3. That is, the number k of largest co-efficients used in each experiment is roughly equal to the 0 noise budget used. We note that k values have been chosen to meet our computational constraints. As such, any other values that fit the hypotheses of Theorem 1 would work just as well. The results in Table 2 show that on average, the recovery error is well below the upper bound for each dataset. This is quantified by ∆ ∞ and ∆ 2 that show a large difference between the upper bound and the observed error for all three datasets. We will utilize this observation in Section 7.2 when we show that recovery works well even when t is outside the theoretical constraints of Theorem 1.
Recovery with Algorithm 2
We implement Algorithm 2 using the open source library CVXPY [6] . We set k = 8 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST and are allowed an 0 noise budget of t = 8. For CIFAR-10, we set k = 10 and are allowed a noise budget of t = 8. We observe the results in Table 3 and note once again that the recovery error is well below the upper bound. This observation will also be useful in Section 7.2, where we will show that recovery error of Algorithm 2 is small for values of t that are well outside the theoretical constraints of Theorem 2.
2 noise
Now we consider the case when the noise vector e i , i = 1, 2, . . . 500 is only bounded in 2 -norm. This case is covered by the guarantees provided in Theorem 3. First we describe the procedure used to construct each noise vector. For each e i , i = 1, 2 . . . 500, we set (e i ) j = c j , where c j is sampled from the uniform distribution on [0, 1). Since there is no restriction on how small k needs to be, we set k = 75 for CIFAR-10 and k = 40 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. We report δ 1 , δ 2 , ∆ 1 , ∆ l 2 and since the noise budget is in 2 -norm, we also report 2avg := 500 i=1 ||e i || 2 . The results are shown in Table 4 . As was the case in the Section 7.1.1, the recovery error is well below the upper bound here as well. This observation will be useful in Section 7.3 where we are able to create high quality reconstructions for 2 -norm bounded attacks.
Making note of the results from Section 7.1.1 and 7.1.2, we now show that CRD can be used to defend against 0 -norm and 2 -norm bounded adversarial inputs.
Defense against 0 -norm attacks
This section is organized as follows: first we examine CRD against the One Pixel Attack (OPA) [22] for CIFAR-10. We only test the attack on CIFAR-10 as it is most effective against natural images and does not work well on MNIST or FASHION-MNIST. We note that this attack satisfies the theoretical constraints for t provided in our guarantees, hence allowing us to test how well CRD works within our gaurantees. Once we establish the effectiveness of CRD against OPA, we then test it against two other 0 -norm bounded attacks: Carlini and Wagner (CW) 0 -norm attack [4] and the Jacobian based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [19] . For the latter two attacks, we test CRD on the all three datasets. Each experiment is conducted on a set of 1000 points sampled uniformly at random from the test set of the respective dataset.
One Pixel Attack
We first resize all CIFAR-10 images to 125 × 125 × 3 while maintaining aspect ratios to ensure that the data falls under the hypotheses in Theorem 1 even for large values of k. The OPA attack perturbs exactly one pixel of the image, leading to an 0 noise budget of t = 3 per image. The 0 noise budget of t = 3 allows us to use k = 275 for recovery with Algorithm 1. Even though OPA only perturbs one pixel per image, Table 5 shows that it is very effective against natural images and forces the network to misclassify all correctly classified inputs. Figure 1 shows that adversarial images created using OPA are visually almost indistinguishable from the original images. We test the performance of CRD in two ways: a) reconstruction quality b) network performance on reconstructed images.
In order to analyse the reconstruction quality of Algorithm 1, we do the following: for each test image, we use OPA to perturb the image and then use Algorithm 1 to approximate its largest (in absolute value) k = 275 DCT co-efficients. We then perform the IDCT on these recovered co-efficients to generate reconstructed images. The reconstructed images from Algorithm 1 can be seen in the second row of Figure 2 . These reconstructions are then compared to the original images presented in the first row of the same figure.
Noting that Algorithm 1 leads to high quality reconstruction, we now test whether network accuracy improves on these reconstructed images. To do so, we feed these reconstructed images as Table 6 : Network performance on the original inputs, adversarial inputs and the inputs corrected using CRD. Here the t avg column lists the average adversarial budget for each attack, Orig. Acc. column lists the accuracy of the network on the original inputs, the Acc. columns shows the accuracy on adversarial inputs, the IHT-Acc. and the BP-Acc. columns list the accuracy of the network on inputs that have been corrected using Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 respectively.
input to the network and report its accuracy in Table 5 . We note that network performance does indeed improve as network accuracy goes from 0.0% to 68.3% using Algorithm 1. Therefore, we conclude that CRD provides a substantial improvement in accuracy in against OPA.
CW-0 Attack and JSMA
Having established the effectiveness of CRD against OPA, we move onto the CW 0 -norm attack and JSMA. Since these two attacks do not necessarily satisfy the required hypotheses on t for Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we call upon the results of Section 7.1.1 to test if CRD is still able to defend the network against these attacks. For instance, in the case of the CW-0 attack, there is no way to pre-specify a fixed adversarial noise budget since the attack iteratively reduces the number of perturbed pixels until it is no longer effective. For JSMA one can pre-specify an adversarial budget, but as noted in [1] , JSMA is only effective with larger values of t. However, even when t is much larger than the hypotheses of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we find that CRD is still able to defend the network. We observe that this is related to the behaviour of the RIP of a matrix for "most" 3 vectors as opposed to the RIP for all vectors, and leave a more rigorous analysis for a follow up work.
To begin our analysis, we show adversarial images for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST created by CW-0 and JSMA in Figure 3 . The first row contains the original test images while the second and the third rows show the adversarial images. We show adversarial images for the CIFAR-10 dataset in Figure 4 . Next, we follow the procedure described in Section 7.2.1 to analyze the quality of reconstructions for Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, we show the reconstructions of Algorithm 1 in Figure 5 and for Algorithm 2 in Figure 6 . For CIFAR-10, we show the reconstructions for Algorithm 1 in Figure 7 and for Algorithm 2 in Figure 8 . In each case it can be seen that both algorithms provide high quality reconstructions for values of t that are well outside the hypotheses required by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. We report these t values and the improvement in network performance on reconstructed adversarial images using CRD in Table 6 .
Note that while the network accuracy for all datasets improves substantially using CRD, for Algorithm 1, network accuracy on reconstructed images for CIFAR-10 remains considerably lower than accuracy on original images. We observe that a possible reason may be the difference in prop- erties of DCT co-efficients of MNIST/Fashion-MNIST data versus data from CIFAR-10. Consider the definition of (k, )-sparse adapted from [1] : a (k, )-sparse vector x ∈ C n follows the constraint ||x t(k) || 2 ≤ ||x h(k) || 2 . The point of this definition is that smaller values of mean the vector x is closer to being k-sparse. We notice that the average value of for DCT co-efficients for CIFAR-10 is approximately 0.30 while that for MNIST is 1.06 and Fashion-MNIST is approximately 0.89, where k = 0.05n . Based on our limited experimental results, it may be hypothesized that Algorithm 1 works well for larger values of , when k, t do not do not fit the constraints of Theorem 1. However, a deeper investigation is required to understand what makes Algorithm 1 perform poorly for CIFAR-10.
Defense against 2 -norm attacks
In the case of 2 -norm bounded attacks, we use the CW 2 -norm attack [4] and the Deepfool attack [18] as they have been shown to be the most powerful. We note that Theorem 3 does not impose any restrictions on k or t and therefore the guarantees of equations (5) and (6) are applicable for recovery in all experiments of this section. Figure 9 shows examples of each attack for the CIFAR-10 dataset while adversarial images for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST are presented in Figure 10 .
The reconstruction quality for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST is shown in Figure 11 and for CIFAR-10 we show the reconstruction quality in Figure 12 . It can be noted that reconstruction Table 7 : Accuracy of our network on the original inputs, adversarial inputs and the inputs corrected using CRD. Here the 2avg column lists the average 2 -norm of the attack vector, Acc. columns list the accuracy of the network on the original and adversarial inputs, and the Corr. Acc. columns lists the accuracy of the network once the inputs have been corrected using CRD.
using Algorithm 2 is of high quality for all three datasets. In order to check whether this high quality reconstruction also leads to improved performance in network accuracy, we test each network on reconstructed images using Algorithm 2. We report the results in Table 7 and note that Algorithm 2 provides a substantial improvement in network accuracy for each dataset and each attack method used. We can conclude that CRD is able to defend neural networks against 2 -norm bounded attacks.
Original CW 2 7.4 Which recovery algorithm to use for 0 -norm attacks As shown in Section 7.1.1, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 lead to high quality reconstructions for 0 -norm bounded attacks. Hence, it is conceivable that CRD using either algorithm should be able to provide a good defense. However, we found that reconstructions using Algorithm 2 led to better network accuracy for CIFAR-10 than Algorithm 1 while Algorithm 1 outperformed Algorithm 2 for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. Therefore, the algorithm to use may be dependent on the dataset in question. The next question to examine is which algorithm is faster in practice. Since Algorithm 2 is not technically an algorithm, its runtime is dependent on the actual method used to solve the optimization problem. For instance, we use Second Order Cone Programming (SOCP) from CVXPY [6] for solving the minimization problem in Algorithm 2. In our experiments, we noticed that the runtime of Algorithm 2 slows considerably for larger values of n. However, Algorithm 1 does not face this issue (there is a slowdown but it is much smaller than Algorithm 2). Therefore, if speed is important, it may be beneficial to use Algorithm 1 as opposed to Algorithm 2 for recovery in the case of 0 -norm attacks.
Deepfool

Conclusion
We provided recovery guarantees for corrupted signals in the case of 0 -norm bounded and 2 -norm bounded noise. We then experimentally verified these guarantees and showed that for the datasets used, recovery error was considerably lower than the upper bounds of our theorems. We were able to utilize these observations in CRD and improve the performance of neural networks substantially in the case of 0 -norm bounded noise as well as 2 -norm bounded noise. While 0 -norm attacks don't necessarily satisfy the constraints required for our guarantees, we showed that CRD is still able to provide a good defense for values of t much larger than allowed by Theorems 1 and 2.
In the case of 2 -norm bounded adversaries, the guarantees of Theorem 3 were applicable in all experiments and CRD was shown to improve network performance for all attacks.
